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While many developing-country policymakers see heax'y fertilizer subsidies as critical to
raismg agricultural productivity, most economists see them as distortionary, regressive,
environmentally unsound, and argue that they result in politicized, inefficient distribution of
fertilizer supply. We model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertilizer, and
assume some are stochastically present-biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias.
Even when relatively patient, such fanners may procrastinate, postponing fertilizer purchases
until later periods, when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer. Consistent with the
model, many farmers in Western Kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profitable
fertilizer investments, but they do invest in response to small, time-limited discounts on the
cost of acquiring fertilizer (free delivery) just after har\'est. Later discounts have a smaller
impact, and when given a choice of price schedules, many farmers choose schedules that
induce advance purchase. Calibration suggests such small, time-limited discounts yield
higher welfare than either laissez faire or heavy subsidies by helping present-biased fanners
commit to fertilizer use without inducing those with standard preferences to substantially
overuse fertilizer.
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"The rest ofthe world isfed because ofthe use ofgood seed and inorganic fertilizer, full
stop. This technolog}' has not been used in most ofAfrica. The only way you can helpfarmers




Stephen Can; former World Bank specialist on Sub-Saharan Afi'ican agriculture, quoted in
Dugger,2007. .-..,.,..- -...•.-, ,,,.. , . , ...... .,, , , ,.-........'
Many agricultural experts see the use of modem inputs, in particular fertilizer, as the key to
agricultural productivit}'. Pointing to the strong relationship between fertilizer use and yields
in test plots, they argue that fertilizer generates high returns and that dramatic growth in ; '
agricultural yields in Asia and the stagnation of yields in Africa can largely be explained by
increased fertilizer use in Asia and continued low use in Africa (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and
Byerlee, 2007). Based on this logic, ElHs ( 1 992) and Sachs (2004) argue for fertilizer •' '•
subsidies. Many governments have heavily subsidized fertilizer. In India, for example, •
fertilizer subsidies amounted to 0.75 percent of GDP m 1999-2000 (Gulati and Narayanan,
2003). In Zambia, fertilizer subsidies consume almost 2 percent of the government's budget
(World Development Report. 2008). ' . '
In contrast, the Chicago tradition associated with Schultz (1964) starts with the
presumption that farmers are rational profit maximizers, so subsidies will distort fertilizer use
away from optimal levels. Others have argued that fertilizer subsidies create large costs
beyond these Harberger triangles. They are r)'pica!!y regressive as wealthier farmers and
those with more land often benefit most from subsidies (Donovan, 2004), and loans for
fertilizer often go to the politically connected and have low repayment rates. Moreover, while
moderate fertilizer use is environmentally appropriate, overuse of fertilizer induced by
subsidies can cause environmental damage (World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, fertilizer
subsidies may lead to government involvement in fertilizer distribution, politicization, and
very costly failures to supply the right kind of fertilizer at the right time.
Partly due to the dominance of the anti-subsidy view among economists and
international financial institutions, fertilizer subsidies have been rolled back in recent
decades. Recently, however, they have seen a resurgence. For example, after Malawi's
removal of fertilizer subsidies was followed by a famine, the country' reinstated a two-thirds
subsidy on fertilizer. This was followed by an agricultural boom which many, including
Jeffrey Sachs, attribute to the restoration of the fertilizer subsidies (Dugger, 2007).
A key assumption in the Chicago tradition case against fertilizer subsidies is that fanners
would use the privately optimal quantity of fertilizer without subsidies. To reconcile low
fertilizer use with the large increases in yield from fertilizer use found in agricultural research
stations, economists often note that conditions on these stations differ from those on real-
world farms, and returns may be much lower in real conditions, where farmers cannot use
other inputs optimally. There is evidence that fertilizer is complementary with improved seed,
irrigation, greater attention to weeding, and other changes in agricultural practice that fanners
may have difficulty in implementing. However, in previous work we implemented a series of
trials with farmers on their own farms in a region of Western Kenya where fertilizer use is
low. Those trials showed that when fertilizer is used in limited quantities, it generates returns
of 36 percent over a season on average, which translates to 70 percent on an annualized basis
(Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2008), even without other changes in agricultural practices.
Low investment rates in the face of such high returns are particularly puzzling since fertilizer
is well-known and long-used m the area. Moreover, since fertilizer is divisible, standard
theory would not predict credit constraints would lead to low investment traps in this
context.' There could of course be fixed costs in buying or learning to use fertilizer (for
example, making a trip to the store). Indeed, small fixed costs of this type will play an
important role in our model. However, such costs would have to be implausibly large to
justify the lack of fertilizer investment in the standard model."
In this paper we argue that just as behavioral biases limit investment in attractive
financial investments in pension plans by workers in the United States (e.g., Choi, Laibson
and Madrian, 2008), they may limit profitable investments in fertilizer by farmers in
developing countries. We set out a simple model of biases in farmer decision-making inspired
by models of procrastination from the psycholog\' and economics literature (see O'Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999). In the model some farmers are (stochastically) present-biased and at least
partially naive, systematically underestimating the odds that they will be impatient in the
future, at least in the case when they are patient today. Going to the store, buying fertilizer,
and perhaps deciding what type of fertilizer to use and how much to buy, involves a utility
' As discussed below, profits are concave rather than convex in fertilizer use per unit of land area. Moreover,
since farmers always have the option of applying fertilizer intensely on some land while leavmg other pieces of
land unfertilized, returns must be non-increasmg.
" For instance, consider a farmer with an hourly wage of SO. 1 3 over for whom round trip travel to town to buy
fertilizer takes one hour and who can only initially afford $1 worth of fertilizer. Since half a teaspoon of top
cost. Even if this cost is small, so long as farmers discount future utility, even farmers who
plan to use fertilizer will choose to defer incurring the cost until the last moment possible, if
they expect to still be willing to purchase the fertilizer later. However, farmers who end up
being impatient in the last period in which buying is possible will then fail to invest in
fertilizer altogether.
Under the model, heavy subsidies could induce fertilizer use by stochastically hyperbolic
farmers, but they also could lead to overuse by farmers without time consistency problems.
The model implies that if offered just after har\'est (when fanners have money) small, time-
limited discounts on fertilizer could induce sizeable changes in fertilizer use. In particular,
early discounts of the same order of magnitude as the psychic costs associated with fertilizer
purchase can induce the same increase m fertilizer use as much larger discounts of the order
of magnihide of the out-of-pocket costs of fertilizer later in the season. Moreover, ex ante
(before the harvest) some farmers would choose to be eligible for the discount early on, so as
to have an option to commit to fertilizer use.
In collaboration with International Child Support (Kenya) a non-government
organization (NGO), we designed and tested a program based on these predictions. Using a
randomized design, we compared the program to alternative inter\'entions, such as standard
fertilizer subsidies or reminders to use fertilizer. The results are consistent with the model.
Specifically, offering free delivery to farmers early in the season increases fertilizer use by 46
to 60 percent. This effect is greater than that of offering free delivery, even with a 50 percent
subsidy on fertilizer, later in the season.
Following an approach similar to O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006). we use the model to
analyze the impact of different policies depending on the distribution of patient, impatient,
and stochastically present-biased farmers. Calibrations based on our empirical results suggest
that 71 percent of farmers are stochastically present-biased, 16 percent are always patient,
and 13 percent are always impatient. This yields a prediction that roughly 55 percent of
farmers should never use fertilizer in the three seasons we follow them. Empirically, 52
percent of comparison farmers do not use fertilizer in any of the three seasons for which we
have data. The calibrated model matches other moments in the data, in particular the
proportion of farmers who take up fertilizer when given the choice of which date they would
like to be offered free fertilizer delivery.
dressing fertilizer yields returns of 36 percent over a season, netting out the lost wages would leave the famier
with a 23 percent rate of return over a few months.
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The calibration suggests that a "paternalistic libertarian" (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)
approach of small, time-limited discounts could yield higher welfare than either laissez faire
policies or heavy subsidies, by helping stochastically hyperbolic farmers commit themselves
to invest in fertilizer while avoiding large distortions m fertilizer use among time-consistent
farmers, and the fiscal costs of heav>' subsidies.
The rest of the paper is strucmred as follows: Section 2 presents background information
on agriculture and fertilizer in Western Kenya. Section 3 presents the model and derives
testable predictions. Sections 4 lays out the program used to test the model; Section 5 reports
results, and Section 6 calibrates the model and then uses the calibrated model to compare
welfare under laissez faire, heavy subsidies, and small time-limited subsidies. Section 7
examines alternative hypotheses, and Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the potential
for realistically scaling up small, time-limited subsidies in a way that would not involve
excessive administrative costs.
2. Background on Fertilizer use in Western Kenya
Our study area is a relatively poor, low-soil fertility area in Western Kenya where most
farmers grow maize, the staple food, predominantly for subsistence. Most farmers buy and
sell maize on the market, and store it at home. There are two agricultural seasons each year,
the "long rains" from March/April to July/August, and the less productive "short rains" from
July/August until December/Januar}'. ;, . ;.
Based on evidence from experimental model fanns (see Kenyan Agricultural Research
Institute, 1994), the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture recommends that farmers use hybrid
seeds. Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) fertilizer at planting, and Calcium Ammonium
Nitrate (CAN) fertilizer at top dressing (when the maize plant is knee-high, approximately
one to two months after planting). Fertilizer is available in small quantities at market centers
(and occasionally in local shops outside of market centers). Our rough estimate is that the
typical farmer would need to walk for roughly 30 minutes to reach the nearest market center.
Although there is a market for reselling fertilizer, it is not very' liquid and resale involves
substantial transaction costs.''
Experiments on actual farmer plots suggest low, even negative returns to the
combination of hybrid seeds and fertilizer at planting and top dressing, (Duflo, Kremer, and
" Discussions with people familiar with the area suggest reselHng fertilizer typically involves a discount of
approximately 20 percent of the cost of fertilizer in addition to the search costs of finding a buyer.
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Robinson, 2008), although it is plausible that returns might be higher if farmers changed
other fanning practices. Similarly, the use of a full teaspoon of fertilizer per plant as top
dressing is not profitable, because farmers realize large losses when rains fail or are delayed
and seeds do not germinate. However, a more conservative strategy of using only one half
teaspoon of fertilizer per plant as top dressing, after it is clear that seeds have germinated,
yields a high return and eliminates much of the downside risk. The average farmer in our
sample plants just under one acre of maize. Using one half teaspoon of fertilizer per plant
increases the yield by about $54 per acre and costs $40 per acre, a 36 percent return over the
several months between the application of fertilizer and harvest (70 percent on an annualized
basis) on real-world farms even in the absence of other complementary changes in farmer
behavior. The incremental yield associated with the second half teaspoon of fertilizer is
valued at approximately $18 per acre, corresponding to a negative return of around -55
percent at full price, but a 30 percent return under a two-thirds subsidy, very close to the
return to the first half teaspoon at full price.
However, despite these large potential returns to applying limited quantities of fertilizer
as top dressing, only 40 percent of farmers in our sample report ever having used fertilizer
and only 29 percent report using it in at least one of the two growing seasons before the
program.'' When asked why they do not use fertilizer, farmers rarely say fertilizer is
unprofitable, unsuitable for their soil, or too risky: instead, they overwhelmingly reply that
they want to use fertilizer but do not have the money to purchase it. Of farmers interviewed
before the small-scale agricultural trials we conducted, only 9 percent said that fertilizer was
unprofitable while 79 percent reported not having enough money. At first this seems difficult
to take at face value: fertilizer can be bought in small quantities (as small as one kilogram)
and with annualized returns of 70 percent, purchasing a small amount and in\'esting the
proceeds would eventually yield sufficient money to generate sufficient funds to fertilize an
entire plot. Even poor farmers could presumably reallocate some of the proceeds of their
har\'esl from consumption to fertilizer investment per acre.
One way to reconcile farmers" claims that they do not have money to buy fertilizer with
the fact that even poor fanners have resources available at the time of han'est is that farmers
may initially intend to save in order to purchase fertilizer later but then fail to follow through
on those plans. In fact, 97.7 percent of fanners who participated in the demonstration plot
These figures differ slightly from those ir. Duflo, Kremer. and Robinson (2008) because the sample of famiers
differs.
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program reported that they planned to use fertilizer in the following season. However, only
36.8 percent of them actually followed through on their plans and used fertilizer in the season
in which they said they would. Thus, it appears that even those who are initially planning to
use fertilizer often have no money to invest in fertilizer at the time it needs to be applied, for
planting or top dressing, several months later.
3. Model
Below we propose a model of procrastination similar to those advanced to explain the failure
of many workers in developed countries to take advantage of profitable financial investments
(O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) and derive testable predictions. In the model, some farmers
are present-biased, with a rate of time preference that is realized stochastically each period.
When they are very present-biased, fanners consume all they have. When they are
moderately present-biased, farmers make plans to use fertilizer. But early in the season,
patient farmers overestimate the probabilit)' that they will be patient again, and thus they
postpone the purchase of fertilizer until later, and save in cash instead. Later, if they turn out
to be impatient, they consume all of their savings instead of investing in fertilizer, resulting in
a lower usage of fertilizer than the farmer in the early period would have wanted.
3.1 Assumptions
Preferences and Beliefs
Suppose that some fraction of farmers '). are patient. They are time consistent and
exponentially discount the future at rate pi^.
A proportion d) is (stochastically) present-biased, and systematically understate the
extent of this present bias. In particular suppose that in period k\ these farmers discount every
future period at a stochastic rate pk (for simplicity we assume that there is no discounting
between future periods). In each period /.-, with some probability p, the fanner is fairly patient
(/3i. = pfi), and with probability ( 1 - p), the fanner is quite impatient {6k = Pl).
Furthermore, while fanners do recognize that there is a chance that they will be impatient in
the future, they overestimate the probability that they will be patient. Specifically, the
probability that a patient farmer believes that she will still be patient in the future is p > p.
There are several ways to interpret this stochastic rate of discount. One interpretation is
that farmers are literally partially naive about their hyperbolic discounting, as in the original
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) framework. An alternative interpretation, along the lines of -
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008a), is that a consumption opportunity occasionally arises
(e.g., a party) that is tempting to the farmer in that period, but which is not valued by the
farmer in other periods.
A final proportion i" are alwcn's impatient so that (3k = Pl in all periods. All farmers are
one of these three tj^pes so ^ + (p + V' = 1-
Finally, for simplicity', we assume per-period utility' in any period is simply consumption
in that period, less a small utility cost associated with shopping for fertilizer and the time cost
associated with deciding what quantity of fertilizer to buy, which will be described below.
Timing and Production
There are four periods. Period is immediately prior to the har\'est. The farmer does not plan
to save, consume or purchase fertilizer in this period, but we will later consider a situation m
which the farmer can pre-commit to different patterns of fertilizer pricing in this period. We
will initially abstract from period but later allow the fanner .to make a choice of a pnce
schedule for fertilizer in period 0.
In period 7, the farmer harvests maize, receives income .t > 2, and can allocate income
between consumption, purchase of fertilizer for the next season, and a short-run investment
that yields liquid returns by the time fertilizer needs to be applied. Some farmers, such as
those who have shops where they can use more working capital, will have high return
investments that yield liquid returns over a short period, whereas others will have lower
return investment opportunities. We therefore assume the net return R is high (/?) for a
proportion A of farmers, and low {R > 0) for the rest. Farmers know their rate of return with
certainty.
Fanners can choose to use zero, one or two units of fertilizer. We assume discreteness of
fertilizer investment to keep the analysis tractable and to parallel our previous empirical
work, which examined the returns to zero, half or one teaspoon of fertilizer per plant.
However, the discreteness does not drive our results.
Let pfi denote the price of fertilizer in period 1. Purchasing any fertilizer also entails a
small utilitv' cost / (encompassing the time cost of going to the shop to buy the fertilizer, as
well as deciding what type to use and how much to buy). This cost is independent of the
amount of fertilizer purchased. Note that while fertilizer is a divisible technology, the
assumption that there is some fixed cost of shopping for fertilizer is consistent with our
finding that few farmers use very small amounts of fertilizer—they tend to either use no
fertilizer or fertilize a significant fraction of their crop.^
At the beginning ofperiod 2, which can be thought of as the time of planting for the next
season, those who have invested in period 1 receive 1 + i? for each unit invested. Farmers
receive no additional income during this period: farmers can only consume by using their
savings and, if they have sufficient wealth, purchase either one or two units of fertilizer at
price p/2 per unit incurring co^r/if they do so. Borrowing is not possible.
The cost of producing fertilizer is assumed to be one, so that under competition and
laissez-faire, pji = p/2 = 1. We will also consider the impact of heavy government subsidies
of the r>'pe adopted by Malawi, under which p/i = pfo = |, as well as a small, time-limited
subsidy in which 7:1^1 < 1 and pf2 = 1.
In period 3, farmers receive income Y'iz), where z is the amount of fertilizer used.
Define the incremental yield to fertilizer as j/(l) = V'(l) — i'(0) and j/(2) = Y{2) - V'(l).
We assume that the cost of reselling fertilizer is sufficiently large to discourage even
impatient farmers from doing so. Maize, on the other hand is completely liquid and can be
converted to cash at any time. Empirically, maize is much more liquid than fertilizer and can
be easily traded at local markets.
Assumptions on Parameters
;
^ye assume: ., ;....: ,.• ' .
.•:.--
. /3Hy{l)>l + f '. ; - ; (1)
'^=






<y(2)<i - • • , (3)
>y(2) .' :(4)
-
' The first condition ensures that a patient farmer prefers using one unit of fertilizer to zero
units of fertilizer, even if it has to be purchased right away. The second implies that an
impatient farmer will prefer to consume now rather than to save in order to invest in fertilizer
if the price is not heavily subsidized, even if it is possible to delay the decision and shopping
^ For instance, among farmers who were not offered free delivery or subsidized fertilizer, between 20 percent
and 30 percent use top dressing fertilizer in a given season, but over 75 percent of those who do use fertilizer
use it on their entire plot. '
costs of purchasing fertilizer to a future period, and even if the rate of return to the period 1
investment is high. The second condition also ensures that impatient farmers will buy
fertilizer if it is heavily subsidized at two-thirds the cost of fenilizer, whatever the return to
their period 1 investment opportunity. The third condition implies that the second unit of
fertilizer is not profitable at the full market price (and that therefore no farmers will want to
use more than one unit at full price), and also implies that patient farmers will prefer to use
two units at a heavy subsidy of two-thirds of the cost of fertilizer (note that the third
condition does not include the shopping cost / because the cost is incurred if the farmer uses
any fertilizer and does not depend on the quantity used). The fourth condition implies that
impatient farmers will not use a second unit of fertilizer even with a heavy subsidy of two-
thirds the cost of fertilizer. ,,,,._.,
These conditions match our empirical evidence on the rates of return to fertilizer (Duflo,
et al., 2008) since we find that the return to the first unit of fertilizer is high, and that the
incremental return to the second unit is negative at market prices. The assumptions are also
consistent with evidence that the incremental return to the second unit at a two-thirds subsidy
is similar to the return to the first unit at market prices, which suggests that patient farmers
(who use fertilizer without a subsidy) would be likely to use two units at subsidized prices,
Finally, for completeness, we assume that /?'// (1 -h /?) > IJdl{1 + R) < 1,
/5h(1 + R) > 1, which implies that patient period 1 farmers with high returns always make
the period 1 investment while impatient fanners never do.
In subsections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 we consider farmer behavior under laissez-faire, in which
Pf.^
=z Pf2 = I: traditional heavy subsidies of the type adopted m Malawi in which
p^j = pj2 = i; and c) time-limited discounts under which pji < 1 and pf2 = 1.
3.2 Farmer Behavior Under Laissez-faire (p/i = p/2 = 1)
Under laissez-faire, by assumption (1), the proportion n of fanners who are always patient in
every period will always use one unit of fertilizer. All will save at rate R in period 1 and buy
fertilizer in penod 2. By assumption (2), the proportion w of farmers who are always
impatient will never use fertilizer. By our other assumptions, they will not avail themselves of
the investment opponunit)', whatever the return.
Now consider the problem of a stochastically present-biased farmer deciding whether
(and when) to buy fertilizer. To solve the model, we work backwards, beginning with the
problem of a farmer in period 2, who must choose between consuming one unit, or investing
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it in fertilizer. Assumption (1) implies that a farmer who has sufficient wealth and is patient
in period 2 will use fertilizer. Assumption (2) implies that a farmer who is impatient in period
2 will not use fertilizer.
Now consider the problem of a farmer in period 1 . First, observe that a farmer who is
impatient in period 1 will consumer, and will not save: seen from period 1, the gain from
investing in one unit of fertilizer is at best Piyfl) - /u./ (if the farmer ends up being patient
and buys fertilizer), which, by assumption (2), is smaller than p^ (the loss in consumption
in period 1 from saving to purchase fertilizer in period 2, for a farmer with a high return
saving opportunity). This farmer will also not save since we assume that /3l(1 + /?) < 1.
Now consider a farmer who is patient in period 1 . Investing in fertilizer today dominates
consuming everything today: the farmer's utility if she purchases one unit of fertilizer and
consumes the rest is x — 1 — / + dnvi'^), while her utility is .?• if she consumes everything
today. By assumption (1), utility from buying fertilizer is higher than not buying.
Now. in period 1. should a patient farmer buy the fertilizer right away, or plan to wait to
do it in period 2"! If a farmer who is patient today has a sufficiently high subjective
probabilit}' of being patient again (and therefore a high probability' of buying fertilizer in
period 2). then it is best to wait, and thus realize the return on the period 1 investment and
postpone paying the utility cost of buying fertilizer until period 2. To see that postponing may
be optimal, note that if the farmer waits, ends up being patient in period 2, and thus purchases








- \ + R
If she ends up being impatient (which she believes will happen with probability 1 - p,
her utility is r - 1 + /S/^. .•
Thus, waiting is optimal if .
•' X - -i- + p/3«(y(l) -/) + (!- v)^H > .T - 1 - / + /3Hy(l)
^^+1 (6)
Rearranging, we find that the farmer will wait if •
/(1-P/3h) + y^ >/3//(y(l)-l)(l-p) (7)
When p = 0, the right hand side is equal to /3//(y(l) - 1). If we assume that the utilir\'
cost of using fertilizer is small enough that /?//(y(l) - 1) is larger than / + -~-^, then the right
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hand side of the inequality is larger than the left hand side. Both sides of the inequality
decline with p. but the right hand side is steeper. For p = 1, the left hand side is larger than
the right hand side (which is equal to zero). Thus, for each R, there is a p'(/?) in the interval
(0,1) such that for every p > p*iR), a farmer who is intending to use fertilizer later prefers to
invest in the first period investment opportunity, and plans to buy fertilizer in period 2. It is
easy to see that p'(R] is decreasing with R: the higher the return to the period 1 investment,
the more valuable it is for the farmer to wait.
For the remainder of the model, we assume that p > p*{R). Note that since impatient
period 1 fanners will not save in any case, it is not necessan,' that they believe they will be
more patient in the future than they are in the present for this procrastination problem to arise.
Instead, it is only necessary that patient farmers overestimate the probability that they will
continue to be patient in the fuaire. This tendency to believe that future tastes will more
closely resemble current tastes than they actually will, termed "projection bias," has found
considerable empirical support (Loewenstein. O'Donoghue. and Rabin, 2003).
3.3 Farmer Behavior Under Malawian-StA le Heavy Subsidies (p/i = pjo = j)
One potential way to address underinvestment in fertilizer would be through heavy,
Malawian-sty'le subsidies. Under heavty subsidies, by assumption (3), farmers who are always
patient will buy two units of fertilizer, and by assumption (2), farmers who are always
impatient will buy one unit.
To solve for the behavior of the stochastically impatient farmers in this case, we again
work backwards from period 2. Assumption (2) implies that even fanners who are impatient
in period 2 will use one unit of fertilizer if ;>/2 = |, while assumption (4) implies that
impatient farmers will not want to use two units of fertilizer. A farmer who is impatient in
penod 2 will thus purchase exactly one unit if he has the wealth do to it and has not already
purchased it earlier.
Now consider the case of a stochastically hyperbolic farmer deciding whether to
purchase fertilizer in period 1 . First consider a farmer who is patient m period 1 . .Assumption
(3) implies that a patient farmer wants to either purchase two units, or save enough to buy
two units. Recall that it is efficient for farmers to purchase all of their fertilizer m a single
penod since by doing so they only need to pay the shopping cost of fenilizer once.
If a fanner buys two units of fertilizer immediately, her utility is:
11
.T.-^-f + B„{y{2) + yil)) (8)
If the farmer instead plans to use fertilizer and saves at return R for future fertilizer use,
she will purchase two units of fertilizer if she is patient in period 2. If, however, she is
impatient in period 2 she will purchase only 1 unit. Thus, her expected utility from waiting is:
^ -
^(^-^ + /3//b(i) - / + py(2) + (1 - P)^] (9)
Thus, she will prefer to save and plan to buy fertilizer later if:
3^^^;^^^ +
/(I -M > pH{y{2)
-Iki-p) (10)
By reasoning similar to the case without a subsidy, there is a threshold jfiR) such that
if ;; > p*'(R). farmers who are patient in period I will wait until period 2 to purchase (it is
also easy to see that the threshold decreases with R, so those with higher returns to
investment in period 1 will be more likely to defer purchases). Depending on parameter
values, f>"{R) could be smaller or larger than p'(B). However, if the mcremental renim of
the second unit of fertilizer at the subsidized price is greater or equal to the incremental return
on the first unit of fertilizer at an unsubsidized price (i.e., 3y(2) > v/(l)), then p**(/?) is larger
than p'{B]. Below we assume that p is above both thresholds. Note that this is the best case
scenario for hea\7 subsidy; if p was lower than p*'{R), the stochastically impatient farmers
who are patient in period 1 would all buy two units in period 1, and thus would all end up
overusing fertilizer.
Now, consider a stochastically patient fanner who happens to be impatient in period 1
.
Given our assumptions, she wants to use one and only one unit of fertilizer at the heavily
subsidized price. If she saves, she will thus save enough to purchase one unit, and she will
always follow through on this plan. Therefore, there is no time inconsistency issue for her,
and she will postpone buymg fertilizer until period 2, and will buy exactly one unit,
Overall, a heavy subsidy will induce 100 percent fertilizer usage, but will cause the
always-patient farmers and the stochastically impatient farmers who happen to be patient in
both periods to overuse fertilizer.
3.4 Impact of Time-Limited Discount (pfi < 1 and p/2 = 1)
Consider the impact of a small discount on fertilizer, valid in period 1 only (which
corresponds to the case in which pfi < 1 and pf2 = 1). Consider a discount that is not large
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enough to make purchasing two units of fertilizer profitable, even for a patient farmer (we
will see that this is a reasonable assumption since the necessar>' discount will be small).
To make a patient period 1 farmer prefer purchasing fertilizer in period 1 to waiting to




x-—^ + piy{\)-f) + {l-p)0H<x-pfi-f + l3Hy{l)' (11)
If we define p}i(R) as the price that just satisfies this condition for a farmer with return
to investment i?, then /yyj(/?) IS given by: ^_, , _ ..
.— p*^(/?) = /(p/3^_l) + /3^(l-p)(y(l)_l) + -^. . (12)
Note that when p is close to 1, the price p*^j {R) differs from 1 by a term proportional to
the utility cost/ plus the foregone return to investment (p^)- The intuition is that the only
additional costs that a farmer who is patient in period 1 has to immediately bear when
choosing between investing one unit in the period 1 investment and buying one unit of
fertilizer are the utility cost of purchasing the fertilizer, and the foregone investment
opportunity. Thus, the fanner just needs to be compensated for incurring the decision and
shopping cost / up front, rather than later, as well as for the foregone returns to the period 1
investment. If the returns to the period 1 investment are low, even a small discount, or a
reduction in the utility cost (such as free delivery in period 1 ) may then be sufficient to
induce the farmer to switch to buying fertilizer in period 1, instead of relying on her period 2
self to purchase fertilizer. , '
It is useful to compare the impact of a subsidy m period 1 to an unanticipated subsidy in
period 2. An unanticipated period 2 subsidy will not affect the period 1 decision. An
impatient period 2 farmer with sufficient wealth will decide to use fertilizer if
f - Pf2 < 3Ly(l). We denote the p/n. which just satisfies this inequality as p*j.-,- In order to
induce fertilizer purchase, the discount now needs to be large enough to compensate an
impatient fanner for postponing consumption of py2, not only for incumng the utility cost /:
in the case m which u(l) is close to 1 + / (so that the return to fertilizer is just positive at a
fertilizer price of 1 from an ex ante perspective), the discount is approximately the cost of
delaying one unit of consumption for one period for an impatient person. Thus, a small
discount m penod 1 will have as large of an effect on ultimate fertilizer use as a large
discount in period 2.
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In each case, the farmers affected will be those who are patient in period 1, but impatient
in period 2.
3.5 Choice of Timing of Discount
Finally, let us examine what will happen if the farmer can commit in period to the date at
which she gets a small subsidy. Specifically, we consider a subsidy that is large enough to
induce patient period 1 farmers to purchase fertilizer immediately but not large enough to
induce impatient farmers to buy fertilizer. Suppose there is some fixed discount 5 and the
farmer can choose either p/j = 1 - (5 or pjo = 1 - (5. The price in the other period remains 1.
Consider first the farmers who are always patient. Because the return to the period I
investment opportunity is always positive even when it is low, those farmers will always
request the subsidy in the second period. In period 1, they will save in anticipation of buying
fertilizer in period 2. and will follow through on that plan.
Next, consider farmers who are always impatient. They are not planning to save or use
fertilizer, so they are in principle indifferent on when to get the return. However, if there is
even some small probabilit)' that they will be patient in the future, they will choose to receive
the small discount in penod 2, rather than refuse the program.
Finally, consider the case of the stochastically impatient farmers. If the discount does not
reduce the price of fertilizer below p'f-^{R), then farmers will always choose to take the
discount in period 2, because the discount is not big enough to induce them to buy
immediately in period 1 so the only way that they will buy fertilizer is if they happen to be
patient in both periods. In what follows, we consider the case in which S > I — p'j^{R).









If she chooses to receive the discount in period 2, her expected utility is:
"
• ^k[x + p\y{l)-^^-f]+p{l-p)Pf2Y^] (14)
Note first that current impatience does not affect this decision (since farmers discount all
future periods at the same rate in period 0). Second, observe that when R is close to zero, so
long as p does not equal zero, the farmer will chose the discount in period 1 : since the period
farmer does not care whether the period 1 or period 2 fanner pays the utility cost, the only
gain to delaying the decision is the return to the period 1 investment opportunity'. However,
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as R increases, the value of delaying the discount to period 2 increases, and if j'? is high
enough, the farmer will choose to receive the discount in period 2. Thus, depending on
whether the returns to period I opportunity are high or low. the farmers will choose to receive
the returns in period 1 or in period 2.
3.6 Summary
To summarize, the model gives rise to the following predictions.
1
.
Some farmers will make plans to use fertilizer but will not subsequently follow
through on their plans.
2. Farmers will switch in and out of fertilizer use.
3. A small reduction m the cost of using fertilizer offered in period 1 will increase
fertilizer purchases and usage more than a similar but unexpected reduction offered in period
2. The subsidy only needs to be large enough to compensate the farmer for incurring the
decision and shopping cost up front, rather than later, as well as for the foregone returns to
the period 1 investment. A larger subsidy will be needed in period 2 to induce the same
increase in usage as a small subsidy in period I.
4. When farmers are offered an ex-ante choice betVi-een a small discount in period 1 or
the same discount in period 2. some farmers will choose the discount in period 1. Recall that
for a positive R, time-consistent farmers would always prefer to receive the discount in period
2. Therefore, if there are farmers who choose the discount in period I and follow through by
buying fertilizer, this suggests that some fanners are time inconsistent, and have at least some
awareness of it. . .
4. Testing the Model
As noted above, there is some empirical evidence in favor of predictions 1 and 2: in a sample
of farmers who participated in the demonstration plot program, two-thirds of those who had
made plans to use fertilizer do not end up carrying through with these plans (prediction 1).
We also find significant switching between using and not using fertilizer (prediction 2): a
regression of usage during the main growing season on usage in the main growing season
previous year (as well as a full vector of controls) gives an R" of only 0.25. Suri (2007)
similarly finds considerable switching in and out of fertilizer use in a nationally
representative sample.
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Of course, we may not want to attach much weight to the declared intentions of farmers
and therefore discount the evidence on prediction one. Similarly, other stories could generate
switching in and out of fertilizer use. We therefore focus on predictions 3 and 4 below.
Predictions 3 and 4 of the model suggest that some simple interventions could have large
impacts on fertilizer use. We collaborated with International Child Support (ICS) - Africa, a
Dutch NGO that has had a long-lasting presence in Western Kenya, and is well known and
respected by farmers, to design and evaluate a program using a randomized design that would
encourage fertilizer use if farmers did indeed behave according to the model. To test the
predictions of the model, we implemented multiple versions of the program, and compared
them with alternative inten.'entions. such as a fertilizer subsidy and reminder visits.
4.1.TheSAFI Program
The main program was called the Savings and Fertilizer Initiative (SAFI) program. The
program was first piloted with minor variations over several seasons on a very small scale
with farmers who participated in the on-farm trials described in Duflo, et al. (2008). In these
pilot programs, we focused on acceptance of the program and willingness to buy from ICS. In
2003 and 2004, the program was implemented on a larger scale, and we followed fanners to
determine its impact on fertilizer usage.
Basic SAFI
In its simplest form, the SAFI program was offered at harvest, and offered free delivery of
any combination of planting or top dressing fertilizer. The basic SAFI program worked as
follows: a field officer visited farmers immediately after han'est, and offered them an
opportunity' to buy a voucher for fertilizer, at the regular price, but with free delivery. The
farmer had to decide during the visit whether or not to participate in the program, and could
buy any amount of fertilizer. To ensure that short-term liquidity constraints did not prevent
farmers from making a decision on the spot, farmers were offered the option of paying either
in cash or in maize (valued at the market price). To avoid distorting farmers' decision-making
by offering free maize marketing services, farmers also had the option of selling maize
without purchasing fertilizer. Across the various seasons, the majonty (66 percent) of those
who purchased fertilizer through the program bought with cash, which suggests that maize
was not overvalued m the program. Participating farmers chose a delivery date and received a
voucher specifying the quantity purchased and the delivery date. Choosing late delivery
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would provide somewhat stronger commitment to use fertilizer since fertilizer can potentially
be re-sold (at some cost) and the vouchers themselves were non-transferable.
The basic SAFI program could have reduced the utility cost of fertilizer use, and thus
reduced procrastination, in two ways. First, it can save a tnp to town to buy fertilizer, which
is typically about a 30 minute tnp from the farmers' residences. Suri (2007) argues that
distance to a fertilizer provider accounts for her surprising finding that those who would have
had the highest return to using fertilizer are some of the least likely to use it. Fertilizer is
typically available in major market centers around the time it is needed for application for
maize crops. Since most farmers travel to market centers occasionally for shopping or other
errands, they could pick up fertilizer when they go to town for other reasons.^
Second, and more speculatively, by requiring an immediate decision dunng the field
officer's visit and offering a simple option, the program may have reduced time spent
thinking through which t^'pe of fertilizer to use, and m what quantit}'.
SAFI with ex-ante choice of timing
To test prediction 4 of the model, in the second season of the experiment, farmers were
visited before the harvest (period in our model) and offered the opportunity' to decide when
they wanted to be visited again later to receive a SAFI program: farmers were told that,
during this visit, they would have the opportunity to pay for fertilizer and to choose a deliver)'
date. As discussed earlier, in a standard exponential model, farmers would be expected to
choose a late visit: those who want to use fertilizer would then invest in period 1, and be
prepared for fertilizer purchase in penod 2. If farmers were present-biased but completely
naive, they would also have chosen a late delivery date, since they expect to be patient m the
future, and would then plan to invest in period 1 and purchase fertilizer in period 2. This
would lead to low ultimate adoption. In our model, stochastically hyperbolic farmers whose
penod 1 investment opportunit}' has a high return also choose a late deliver)' date to avoid
forgoins the remms of the investment, but those who have a low return investment
Most farmers who bought fenihzer through the SAFI program d)d not buy enough that they would have had to
pay for transport. On average, fanners who bought fertilizer through the SAFI program bought SJ kilograms of
fertilizer (at a total cost of 135 Kenyan shillings), and only 1 percent of farmers bought more than 10 kilograms.
It would take the average fanner roughly an hour to walk to town, buy fertilizer, and walk back. For a farmer
who makes SI a day over an eight-hour workday, the SAFI program would save her about SO. 13 in lost work
time, or about 1 percent of the cost of the fertilizer bought by the average farmer. This cost would be
substantially smaller if the farmer were gomg to town anNavay and so would not miss any work time.
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opportunity in period 1 will chose an early delivery date, to increase the probability that they
eventually use fertilizer.
4.2 Experimental Design
Two versions of the SAFI programs were implemented as part of a randomized field
experiment, allowing for a test of the model. Farmers were randomly selected from a sample
frame consisting of parents of fifth and sixth grade children in sixteen schools in Kenya's
Busia distnct. The program was offered to individuals, but data was collected on all plots
fanned by the households. And a farmer was considered to use fertilizer if fertilizer was used
on any plot in the household.
The experiment took place over two seasons. In the first season (beginning after the 2003
short rain harvest, in order to facilitate fertilizer purchase for the 2004 long rains season), a
sample of farmers was randomly selected to receive the basic SAFI program. The
randomization took place at the individual farmer level after stratification by school, class,
and participation in two prior agricultural programs (a program to provide farmers with small
amounts of fertilizer in the form of "starter kits'" they could use on their own farm, and a
program to set up demonstration plots on the school property). - . ; ; ,/,.•
In the following season (the 2004 short rains), the program was repeated, but with an
enriched design to test the main empirical predictions of the model in Section 3 as well as
some predictions of alternative models. All treatment groups were randomized at the
individual level after stratification for school, class, previous program participation, and 2003
treatment status.
First, a new set of farmers was randomly selected to receive a basic SAFI visit. Second,
another group of farmer was offered SAFI with ex ante choice of timing (as described above).
Third, to test the h^'pothesis that small reductions in the utility cost of fertilizer have a
bigger effect if offered in period 1. another group of farmers was visited close to the time
fertilizer needs to be applied for top dressing (approximately 2 to 4 months after the previous
season's harx'est, the equivalent of period 2 in our model), and offered the option to buy
fertilizer with free delivery. To calibrate the effect of a discount, a fourth group of farmers
was visited during the same period, and offered fertilizer at a 50 percent discount. This allows
us to compare the effect of a 50 percent subsidy to the effect of the small discount offered by
the SAFI program. In all of these programs, farmers could choose to buy either fertilizer for
planting, top dressing, or both. However, one caveat to bear in mind is that in the late visits
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many farmers had already planted and could only use top dressing fertilizer in that season. If
farmers preferred using fertilizer at planting, however, they could have bought planting
fertilizer for use in the next season, so a standard model would suggest that these farmers






Finally, in each of the intervention groups as well as in the comparison group, a random
subset of farmers was offered the option to sell a set quantity of maize at a favorable price to
the field officer before the program took place. The objective of this additional treatment was
to test the alternative hypothesis that the SAFI program was just seen by the farmers as a
safer way to protect their savings than available alternatives. The purchase of maize put some
cash m the hands of the farmers who accepted the offer, which is more liquid than maize, and
thus arguably easier to waste. If the main reason why farmers purchased fertilizer under the
SAFI program is because of an aversion to holding liquidity, the purchase of maize should
have encouraged them to take SAFI up. Under our model, this would make no difference,
however.
Appendix figure 1 summarizes the experimental design for this second season.
4.3 Data and Pre-Intervention Summary Statistics
The main outcome of interest is fertilizer use, with fertilizer purchase through the program as
an intermediate outcome. We have administrative data from ICS on fertilizer purchase under
the program. Data on fertilizer use was collected at baseline (before the 2003 short rains
harvest) for that season and for the previous season. We later visited farmers to collect
fertilizer usage data for the three seasons following the first SAFI program (i.e., both seasons
in 2004 and one season in 2005). The baseline data also included demographic information
and some wealth characteristics of the sampled households. In households where different
members farm different plots (which is tvpically the case in polygamous households), we
asked each member individually about fertilizer use on her own plot, and we asked the head
of the household (the husband) about fertilizer use on each plot. The data is aggregated at the
household level.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. In season one, 21 1 farmers were eligible to
participate in the basic SAFI program, and 713 farmers constituted a comparison group. In
season two, 228 fanners were eligible to participate in the basic S.A.FI program; 235 were
eligible for the SAFI with ex ante choice of timing; 160 were offered fertilizer at the normal
retail price with free deliver)' at top-dressing time; and 160 were offered fertilizer at half
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price with free delivery at top dressing time. An additional 141 farmers served as a
comparison group.
There were some relatively minor pre-treatment differences between groups in each
season. In season one 43 percent of both SAFI and comparison groups had previously ever
used fertilizer. However, there were some pre-treatment differences in other observables:
comparison group farmers had 0.6 more years of education (a difference significant at the 10
percent level), and were about 5 percent less likely to live in a home with mud floors, mud
walls, or a thatch roof (though only the difference in the probability of having a mud floor is
statistically significant, at 10 percent).'
In season two, the comparison group was more likely to have used fertilizer prior to the
program (table 1
,
panel B). The point estimate for previous fertilizer usage is 5 1 percent for
the comparison group, but only betvv'een 38 percent and 44 percent for the various treatment
groups. Many of these differences are significant at the 10 percent level (the difference is
significant at 5 percent for the 50 percent subsidy group). In addition, the comparison group
has significantly (at 10 percent) more years of education than the group offered SAFI with
the ex ante timing choice.
These pre-treatment differences are in general relatively minor and would, if anything,
bias our estimated effects downwards. We present results with and without controls for
variables with significant differences prior to treatment—in all cases, the inclusion of these
controls does not substantially affect our results.











5.1 The SAFI Program
The SAFI program was popular with fanners. In season one. 3 1 percent of the farmers who
were offered SAFI bought fertilizer through the program. In season two. 39 percent of those
offered the basic version of SAFI bought fertilizer through the program, as did 41 percent of
those offered SAFI with ex ante choice of timing. The fraction of farmers who purchase
fertilizer is of course not equal to the impact of the program on use: some program farmers
Appendix table 1 suggests that attrition patterns were similar across groups. Regressions of indicators for
appearance in the pre-treatment background and post-treatment fertilizer adoption questionnaires on being
sampled for treatment yield no significant differences between groups. Overall, 1 ,232 farmers were sampled,
and we obtained adoption data for 925 of them (75.1 percent). There were few refusals. Nearly all of those who
do not appear in the dataset were not known by other parents in the school and so could not be traced, or were
not at home when ICS enumerators visited their homes.
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who were going to use fertilizer anyu'ay presumably bought fertilizer through SAFI, to take
advantage of the free delivery. In addition, some fanners may not have used fertilizer
purchased through SAFI on their maize crop: they could have kept it. sold it, used it on some
other crop, or the fertilizer could have been spoiled. In the 2005 adoption questionnaire 76.6
percent of the farmers who purchased fertilizer under SAFI reported using it on their own
plot, 7.3 percent on the plot of their wife or husband, and 8.1 percent reported saving the
fertilizer for use in another season. The remainder reported that they had used the fertilizer on
a different crop ( 1 .6 percent) or that the fertilizer had been spoiled.
Overall, in both seasons, the SAFI program had a significant and fairly sizeable impact
on fertilizer use. In season one 45 percent of farmers offered the SAFI program report using
fertilizer in that season, compared to 34 percent of those m the comparison group. ^ The 1
1
percentage point difference is significant at the 1 percent level (see table 1, panel A). In
season two (the 2004 short rains), the basic SAFI program increased adoption by 10.5 percent
(table 1, panel B). .
Table 2 confirms these results in a regression framework. For season one, we run
regressions of the following form:
y, = Q + /3:T,^« + A77 + £- - • (15)
where y, is a dummy indicating whether the household of farmer '/ is using fertilizer, Ti^^ is
a dummy indicating whether farmer /' was offered the SAFI program in season one, and A", is
a vector of control variables for the primary respondent in the household, including the
school and class from which the parent was sampled, educational attainment, previous
fertilizer usage, gender, incom.e, and whether the farmer's home has mud walls, a mud floor,
or a thatch roof, and whether the farmer had received a starter kit in the past. The table
presents fertilizer usage statistics for the season of the program and the two subsequent
seasons.
Both specifications suggest a positive and significant program impact on fertilizer
adoption m season one: the specification with sparser controls suggests that the program led
to an 1 1.4 percentage point increase in fertilizer adoption, while one with fuller controls
Throughout this paper, we focus on usage of fertilizer rather than the quantity of fertilizer used because there is
substantial underlying vanation in the quantity of fertilizer used by farmers, which would make it difficult to
pick up effects in average quantities. The standard deviation in kilograms of fertilizer used is 54, whereas
fanners that bought fertilizer through the SAFI program bought only 3.7 kilograms, on average.
' The starter kit was an inter>.'ention conducted in a previous season, which we discuss in a companion paper. It
involved distributing a small quantity of fertilizer to fanners to let them experiment with fertilizer.
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suggests a 14.3 percentage point increase. Both are significant at the 1 percent level. Given a
baseline usage rate of 22.8 to 24.7 percent (shown on the last row of table 2), these effects
represent a 46 to 63 percent increase relative to the comparison group.
The remaining columns show that the SAFl program does not have persistent impacts: in
the two subsequent seasons (the short rains of 2004 and the long rains of 2005), fertilizer
usage drops back to the level of the comparison group. This lack of persistence would be
expected under our model since the only role of SAFl in this program is to induce the farmer
to buy the fertilizer early in the season, rather than later. In contrast, in learning by doing
models, and models of credit constraints, inducing use in one period would in general affect
the state variables of wealth and knowledge and thus future behavior.
Panel B shows the impact of the SAFl program in the second season on fertilizer usage.
The regression has the same form as for the season one regression, but includes dummies for
all the other SAFl treatments, and controls for a dummy for long rains treatment status
4
Vi = a + J] ^f^'Tl,^ + (5,Bf^ + p.Bf^T^^^ + ^,'7 + e,: (16)
k=i
In this regression, Tif ^ represents the basic SAFl program, and T^f " through T]^^
represent the other treatment groups, respectively, SAFl with ex ante choice of timing; the
visit at top-dressing time that offered fertilizer at full price; and the visit at top-dressing time
that offered fertilizer with a 50 percent subsidy. The dummy Bf'^ is a dummy equal to 1 if
the farmer was offered the opportunity to sell maize at an above-market price during the post-
harvest visit. As before, we present regressions with and without full sets of controls, for
season 1 (the season before the programs were offered), season 2 (the season during which
the programs were offered), and season 3 (one season after the programs were offered).
The first row in panel B, columns (3) and (4) show the impact of the basic SAFl program
on adoption of fertilizer in the season it was offered. Without control variables, the point
estimate for the effect (16.5 percentage points) is even larger than in the first season. Since,
as we saw earlier, adoption was slightly greater in the comparison group before the program
was introduced, the point estimate of the effect increases slightly when controlling for past
adoption to 18.1 percentage points. Given a baseline usage rate of 29.7 to 30 percent in the
comparison group, these effects represent proportional increases of 56 to 60 percent.
'° Treatment was stratified by prior treatment status.
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Columns (1) and (2) show that, reassuringly, there is no difference in adoption across SAFI
groups in the season before it was offered. Columns (5) and (6) replicate the results found for
the first season: the impact of the SAFI program is not persistent.
These results suggest that a properly timed reduction in the utility cost of using fertilizer
can substantially increase adoption. Free delivery saves the fanner a trip to the nearest market
town to get the fertilizer and, smce taking advantage of free deliver,' required deciding on the
type and quantity of fenilizer to order during the visit, the program may have reduced the
cost of time spent making these decisions and thus the chance of procrastmation on those
costs. It is therefore plausible that the reason why this program increased adoption is time
inconsistency and procrastination as posited in the model.
The model predicts that those stochastically hyperbolic farmers who do not have a high
remm period 1 investment opportunit>' will request early delivery. The results for the SAFI
with ex ante timing choice are consistent with the idea that a sizeable fraction of farmers have
a preference for commitment. .Almost half of the farmers (44 percent) offered SAFI with
timing choice asked the field officer to come back immediately after harvest, and 46 percent
of those actually bought fertilizer. Of the remaining fanners, 52 percent requested late
delivery and 39 percent of those who requested late delivery eventually purchased fertilizer;
the remaining 4 percent declined to participate in the SAFI program. These results are very
much consistent with the model, which predicts that as long as p > 0, even quite naive
farmers may want to induce their period 1 selves to purchase fertilizer by requesting the offer
of free delivery early unless they have a high return to their period I investment opportunity.
In contrast, time consistent farmers who attach any probability to using fertilizer would never
choose a penod 1 discount (so long as the returns to investment are positive).
If the parameters are such that farmers with high return investment opportunities prefer
late delivery, our model predicts that fewer farmers should end up using fertilizer under SAFI
with choice of timing then under the basic SAFI, in which free deliver)' is restricted to period
I. This is because the stochastically hyperbolic farmers with high returns to the period 1
investment opportunity buy fenilizer in penod 1 under the basic SAFI. but choose a period 2
discount under S,A.FI with timing choice, and some of those choosing a late deliver,' date
wind up impatient in period 2 and do not buy fenilizer. Empirically, we find that the impact
of the "S.A.FI with ex ante timing choice"" on fertilizer use is if anything slightly larger than
the basic SAFI program. Overall, 41 percent of farmers purchased fertilizer under SAFI with
ex ante timing choice (compared to 39 percent without timing choice), and more farmers
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reported using fertilizer under SAFI with ex ante timing choice (47 percent versus 38
percent), although these differences are not significant (see the second row of panel B, table
2)."
Note, however, the fact that the effect of the SAFI with ex ante choice of timing is as
large as the effect of the basic SAFI helps rule out an alternative explanation for the
popularity of basic SAFI: an "impulse purchase" effect in which when farmers are offered
fertilizer at harvest, when they have money and maize, they feel "flush" and buy it without
thinking, as an impulsive purchase (under this hypothesis, if the field officers had offered
beer or dresses at that point, they would have bought those). This seems reasonable given that
the pre-harvest season is known as the "hungry season" in Kenya, and the field officer does
not offer to sell the farmer anything immediately in the SAFI with ex ante timing choice.
Instead, the field officer offers an opportunity to buy fertilizer in the future: thus, the decision
on when to call the field officer back is unlikely to be an impulsive decision.
Another piece of evidence suggesting that the purchase of fertilizer is not simply an
impulse purchase of farmers who feel "flush" is that farmers were no more likely to purchase
fertilizer under SAFI when they had cash on hand. To test this, we ran a small test in which
the field officer offered to purchase some maize at a favorable price before offering SAFI.
Under this condition, while 50.7 percent of farmers sold maize, 36 percent still purchased
fertilizer under SAFI, and thus the effects of the "bought maize" dummy on fertilizer use, as
well as its interaction with the SAFI dummy, are insignificant and small. This also helps rule
out the possible alternative explanation that SAFI is used by farmers as a safe savings option;
if this were the case, one would have expected them to be more likely to take advantage of
SAFI when they had cash on hand.
Thus, the impact of the two versions of the SAFI suggest that time inconsistency and
procrastination may play a role in explaining low fertilizer use. To rule out alternative
A possible interpretation for the larger effect of SAFI with timing choice is that stochastically hyperbolic '
fanners may differ m their discount rates. In the model, we assume that impatient fanners will never use
fertilizer and that all patient farmers value the return to fertilizer higher than their alternative period 1
investment opportunitv' (even if the return to that investment is high). However, it may be that some fanners
may be (stochastically) intermediately patient (with a discount rate between /3l and ,'J/v) and will commit to
fertilizer purchase in period I only if their period 1 investment has a low return, if they happen to be
intermediately patient in period 1. These fanners will only use fertilizer if they end up being patient (or
intermediately patient) in period 2, and so will request a late SAFI date and will never buy fertilizer in the basic
SAFI but may buy in the SAFI with timing choice. Another possibility is that by warning fanners in advance,
we give them a bit more time to be ready with cash when the field officer arrives.
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explanation of the role SAFI played in inducing farmers to use fertilizer, we tried two
alternative programs with random subsets of farmers, which allow us to test alternative
hypotheses and additional predictions of the model.
5.2. Free Delivery, Free Delivery with Subsidy
Both versions of the SAFI program offered free deliver)'. Our interpretation is that the
resulting decrease in the utilit}' cost of using fertilizer is small enough that it would be
unlikely to induce large changes in fertilizer use m a purely time-consistent model. However,
an alternative explanation is that the free delivery is a substantial cost reduction. To test this
hypothesis, and to test prediction three m our model, we offered free deliver)' later in the
season (corresponding to period 2). We also offered a 50 percent subsidy to a separate,
randomly selected group of farmers at the same point in the season.
As shown in table 1
,
panel B. free delivery later in the season did not lead to fertilizer
purchases from ICS as often as under the SAFI program (20 percent under free deliver)' vs.
39 percent in the S.A.FI). The difference between the fraction of farmers who purchase
fertilizer under free deliver)' late in the season and any of the other groups is significant at the
1 percent level, while all the other groups have similar levels of adoption. When offered a 50
percent subsidy late in the season, 46 percent of farmers bought fertilizer.'"
Table 2 (columns 3 and 4) presents the impacts of the different programs on fertilizer
use, and shows very consistent results: the offer of free delivery late in the season increased
fertilizer use by 9 to 10 percentage points (not significant), less than half the increase due to
the SAFI program (or SAFI with ex ante timing choice). Our model predicts that free delivery
late in the season will have no adoption impact, since those farmers who are patient and take
up this offer would have bought fertilizer on their own anyway (so purchase with free
delivery would entire crowd out purchases that would have happened anyway). Indeed, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the program had no effect, although the positive point
As mentioned earlier, one issue when interpreting these results is that fertilizer can be used either at planting
or at top dressing (when the plant is knee high), or both. Since fanners in the subsidy and full price groups were
visited after planting, it was too late for them to buy planting fertilizer for use in that season (however, while
ver\' few of the farmers who were offered fertilizer at full price at top dressing bought planting fertilizer, 17
percent of the farmers offered the subsidy actually bought planting fertilizer
—
presumably to either sell it or use
it in a future season. By contrast, SAFI farmers could choose berween planting and top dressing fertilizer, or
could get both. This would complicate interpretation of the comparison berween the programs if fertilizer at top
dressing were not effective. However, our earlier estimates (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2008) suggest that
the average rate of return to using fenilizer at top dressing only is 70 percent. We view the decision between
using fertilizer at planting rather than top dressing as a timing decision similar to when to buy.
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estimate may suggest that there may exist some people who are at an intermediate level of
patience, for whom free delivery' is sufficient to induce fertilizer use. Importantly, however,
the difference between the percentage point increase due to SAFl and the percentage point
increase due to free delivery is significant at the 8 percent level. Thus, we can reject that the
timing of the offer does not matter.
Interestingly, a 50 percent subsidy in period 2 significantly increases fertilizer use (by 13
to 14 percentage points), which is very similar to the impact of the free delivery at harvest
time (and statistically undistinguishable). This is consistent with prediction three of the
model.
6 Calibration and Welfare Comparisons
In this section we calibrate the model to determine the fraction of farmers who are
stochastically hyperbolic, the probability that they are patient each period, and the proportion
of stochastically hyperbolic farmers who have a high return to the period 1 investment and so
choose to take SAFI at a later date. We then show that the calibrated model yields reasonable
predictions for the fraction of farmers who never use fertilizer and for ultimate fertilizer
usage among fanners who choose early and late delivery when given ex ante timing choice
under SAFI. Finally, we use the calibrated model to compare welfare between laissez faire,








6.1 Calibrating the Model
Recall that a fraction 7 of farmers are always patient and always use fertilizer and a fraction
ijj of farmers are always impatient and never use fertilizer.'"' The remaining fraction
1 — 7 — 't/' = (6 of farmers are stochastically hyperbolic (as described above), and patient in
any period with probability p.
To solve for the parameters of the model, note that the model implies that the fraction of
farmers using fertilizer without the SAFI program is c/j/r + 7 (since stochastically hyperbolic
fanners use fertilizer only if patient in both periods 1 and 2). Taking the average comparison
group usage from the two SAFI seasons in Table 2, this quantits' is about 0.27 (Columns 1-4).
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Under SAFI, all stochastically hyperbolic farmers who are patient in the first period will use
fertilizer, as will all time-consistent farmers. Hence the proportion of farmers using fertilizer
will be (pp + 7. Using the regression-adjusted estimates with full controls in table 2, this
percentage is about 0.44 in our dataset.
A third equation gives the percentage of non-program farmers that we would expect to
find using fertilizer in the three seasons that we follow them. This percentage is given by
7 + cplp'^)^, and is equal to 0.16 in our dataset. Solving these equations gives us that
p = 0.40, = 0.71, 7 = 0.16, and V' = 0.13,
These estimates are in line with our finding that 52 percent of comparison farmers do not
use fertilizer in any season m which we observe them (we followed farmers for three years
after the first SAFI). Given the parameters above, we would predict that i' + 4>{l — p-)^ =
0.13 + 0.71 * .84^ — 0.55 of farmers would not use fertilizer in those three seasons.
Note that these estimates were derived solely from data on average use with and without
SAFI, not from looking at the correlation in fertilizer use over time, so this provides a first
piece of evidence on the fit of the calibradon.
Another check of the model is the fraction of farmers who end up using fertilizer under
the 50 percent subsidy. If a 50 percent subsidy is enough to induce stochastically impatient
farmers who were patient in period 1, but impatient in period 2, to use fertilizer, the fraction
of farmers using fertilizer under a 50 percent subsidy in period 2 should be (/^p -I- 7 which, we
have seen, is 44 percent (since the same formula gives us the fraction of farmers who use
fertilizer under SAFI). Empirically, the fraction is exactly 44 percent m our data set (see table
2).
To calibrate A, the proportion of farmers with a high-return period 1 investment
opportunit)', note that under the model, if the value of the discount is large enough to induce
those with low-return period 1 investments to choose early deliven,' but not to induce those
with high-return investments to do so. then a proportion (1 — A)(p of farmers choose early
delivery and the remainder ask for late delivery. We therefore set A = 0.35, since 96 percent
'" An alternative Interpretation is that these fanners have land that is not suitable for fenilizer. Note that under
this interpretation, hea\7 subsidies would be less attractive, because such subsidies could lead these farmers to
use fertilizer even if the social planner would not do so.
'"*
It should be noted, however, that the model cannot match the large percentage of farmers who report having
never used fertilizer. One possible reason for this is that farmers may forget if they had used fenilizer long in the
past.
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of those offered SAFI with timing choice accepted it, and 44 percent of those offered it chose
early delivery.
The model implies that
^^^o+v'
~ "^^"^ of those choosing late delivery would end up
actually buying fertilizer. In reality, 39 percent did. This again suggests that the model does
reasonably well in matching statistics that were not used to calibrate it.
Similarly, since the model predicts that the only farmers who will request early delivery
will be the stochastically hyperbolic farmers who prefer committing immediately to saving,
we would expect that a proportion p = 40% of farmers requesting early deliver)' will
eventually purchase. This is ver\' close to the actual percentage of 46 percent.
The model does a bit less well predicting the adoption impact of the SAFI with ex ante
timing choice. We would predict that 4>{Xp + (1 — A)p-) + 7 = 38% would end up using
fertilizer in this variant (less than the basic SAFI), whereas in reality 47 percent did (more
than the basic SAFI). Although 38 percent lies in the confidence interval of our point
estimate, it is further from our calibrated estimate than the other figures.
Finally, one other check on the plausibility of the estimation is whether it implies
implausibly low discount rate of impatient farmers, fii. The condition for an impatient fanner
to not use fertilizer \s (5l[\ — /) > y. Since the mean rate of return to fertilizer is 36 percent
(Duflo, Kremer. and Robinson, 2008), this implies that for / close to 0, l3i < 0.73. This
estimate is similar to an estimate from Laibson, et al. (2007), who estimate a B around 0.7.
6.2 Laissez Faire, Heavy Subsidies, or Nudges?
The calibrated model can be used to provide a rough companson of the welfare impacts of
laissez fair, heavy subsidies, and small nudges (this is similar in spirit to the exercise carried
out in Similar to the approach in O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), to evaluate optimal taxes
when a fraction of agents are not fully rational). For this calculation, we assume that/is small
(effectively zero). We assume that the marginal cost of government funds is 20 percent'^ and
consider a two-thirds subsidy similar to that adopted in Malawi. We also use estimates from
the experiments described in Duflo. et al. (2008). which imply that the incremental return to a
'^ Warlters and Aunol (2005) estimate a marginal cost of public funds of 17 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Kleven and Kreiner (2006) report similar estimates for OECD estimates. The marginal cost of public funds




second unit of fertilizer is -55 percent at market prices, but about 30 percent under a two-
thirds subsidy.
Under the model, a two-thirds subsidy will induce all farmers to use fertilizer but will
cause patient farmers to use two units of fertilizer. Unfortunately, we cannot test this
prediction directly: farmers who do not intend to use fertilizer might buy fertilizer and then
resell it smce heav'y subsidies would be sufficient to cover the transaction costs. Moreover, it
might take time for fanners to adjust to using two units of fertilizer if they need to build up
assets gradually over time due to credit constraints or they need time to learn about the return
to a second unit of fertilizer.
We assume that only patient farmers (the always patient farmers and those stochastically
h>T3erbolic farmers who end up being patient in both periods) will use two units of fertilizer at
a two-thirds subsidy (as discussed below, if even impatient farmers use two units of fertilizer
under a two-thirds subsidy, heavy subsidies would yield even lower welfare). These
categories comprise a proportion 0.16 + 0.71 * .4^ = 27% of farmers. The remaining 73
percent use one unit of fertilizer.
To compare welfare under laissez faire, heavy subsidies, and small, time-limited
subsidies, we first normalize welfare under laissez faire to zero, and then calculate the costs
and benefits of heavy subsidies and small, time-limited subsidies relative to laissez faire.
With a 20 percent marginal cost of funds, the deadweight loss cost of financing a two-thirds
fertilizer subsidy will be 0.2*0.67*[2*0.27+0.73] = 0.170. The deadweight loss from farmers
inefficiently using a second unit of fertilizer is 0.27*0.55 = 0.149. Overall, heavy subsidies
therefore cost 0.3 1 9 relative to laissez faire.
The benefit of this subsidy is (y — 1 — /)('(/' + (t>{l — P')], where the first term is the
benefit from the first unit of fertilizer and the second term is the proportion of farmers who
would not use fertilizer without the subsidy. If we use 1.36 for y (Duflo, et al, 2008). then for
/ = 0, we get a benefit of 0.36*0.73=0.26. For the particular parameter values we examine,
the costs of hea\7 subsidies relative to laissez faire exceed their benefits, but this conclusion
will clearly be sensitive to assumptions on parameters.
By contrast, the SAFI program described in this paper provided farmers a much smaller,
time-limited discount, arguably worth less than 10 percent of the cost of fertilizer. Since
SAFI would be taken up by the 16 percent of farmers who always use fertilizer and the
stochastically hyperbolic farmers who are patient in period 1, the total deadweight cost
incurred in financing these subsidies is therefore 0.1 * 0.2(7 -f- pep) = 0.009. In addition, there
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is a further loss of (-) + p(t>){XR + (1 - X)R) from farmers inefficiently forgoing the period 1
investment opportunity. This is unlikely to be large for many farmers, as few farmers are
likely to have high return investments that yield liquid returns over the short period between
one har\'est and the time fertilizer is needed for top dressing (only a few weeks). Also note
that if some farmers have very high rates of return investment opportunity, they would not
take up S.A.FI. The benefit would be (y — 1 — f){cp{p — p')), which is equal to 0,06. Overall,
in this specific example, SAFI is likely to yield higher welfare than either a laissez faire or
heavy subsidy approach under reasonable assumptions about R.
Note that the parameter values we have chosen for this calculation are ones that are most
favorable to heaw subsidies. The impact of heav>' subsidies would look worse: (1) if the
marginal cost of public funds is higher than 20 percent in developing countries or if providing
subsidies encourages costly rent-seeking, (2) if subsidies induce impatient farmers to overuse
fertilizer, (3) if the never patient farmers in our model actually have land that is unsuitable to
fertilizer such that the returns to fertilizer are lower for them than for other farmers, (4) if
overusing fertilizer has additional environmental costs, or (5) if even heavy subsidies do not
induce the never patient to adopt fertilizer.
It is important to note that we have not considered the whole spectrum of potential policies in
our calibrated model. We have obviously examined only one particular level of heavy
subsidy, and other levels might perform better. In our simple two-type model a perfectly
informed policymaker could potentially choose a level of subsidy just sufficient to induce
impatient farmers to use one unit of fertilizer while not inducing patient farmers to overuse
fertilizer. However, this result would not be robust to more complicated heterogeneity in
patience or continuous choice of fertilizer quantity'. Time-limited discounts are likely
generically more robust than heavy subsidies, in that the losses from time-limited subsidies
are likely to be limited, while heavy subsidies run the risk of seriously distorting fertilizer use
and incurring large deadweight losses from taxation.
Another conclusion that seems likely to be generic is that small, time-limited subsidies
are likely to be preferable to a laissez-faire policy for a wide range of parameter values, so
long as there exists even a small proportion of procrastinating fanners. On the other hand,
with sufficiently many stochastically hyperbolic farmers, and sufficiently few always-patient
farmers, heavy fertilizer subsidies become more attractive.
The "heavy subsidy" policy could be made more attractive by limiting the quantity of
fertilizer available to each fanner. Doing this would help avoid o\'eruse of fertilizer and
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would also help address the problem of high fiscal costs of heav'y subsidies because people
would use lower quantities. Another potential policy would be to provide farmers with bank
accounts that could allow them to "soft commit" to fertilizer but would not force farmers to
completely tie up their money, for instance by making money available in case of other
emergencies. The transactions costs of such accounts would fall in an intermediate
category—far less liquid than holding cash on hand, but more liquid than reselling fertilizer
that has already been purchased. To the extent that liquidit)' is valuable, these r>'pes of bank
accounts could be preferable to a targeted discount.' •
7 Alternative Explanations
The empirical results in this section are consistent with the predictions of the model in section
2. We now review three alternative models that could have similar qualitative predictions,
and report additional evidence on whether these models can explain the data.
7.1 Farmers are Time-Consistent but the Utility Cost of Using Fertilizer is Large
An alternative explanation for the large impact of the free delivery of fertilizer is that farmers
are time-consistent, but the fixed cost of acquinng fertilizer is high, so fertilizer is only worth
purchasing in large enough quantities that credit constraints bind. In this case, free delivery of
fertilizer from a trusted source may increase purchase substantially.
Under this alternative model, free deliver}' later m the season would increase usage as
much as free deliver.' at harvest if the free deliveiy were announced in advance. Prior to
implementing the full scale SAFI program described above. ICS conducted a number of small
pilot SAFI programs with farmers who had previously participated in demonstration plots on
their farms (see Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) for a description of the demonstration
plot programs). Three randomly assigned variants were conducted in different seasons in
different villages, each with its own comparison group. Farmers were always informed about
the program immediately after harvest, but the timing of the free delivery differed across
years. In the first vanant, pilot SAFI program farmers were asked to pay for the fertilizer
right away (as in the basic SAFI program). In the second variant, farmers were informed
about the program, asked whether they wanted to order fertilizer, and given a few days before
° Accounts similar to these are being implemented in Malawi by Xavier Gine, Jessica Goldberg, and Dean
Yang.
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the field officer returned to collect the money and provide the voucher. The third variant was
similar, but the field officer only went back to collect the money just before planting.
For the three pilot SAFI programs, data is available only on purchase under the program,
not on evenmal fertilizer use. Results are presented in table 3. In all the versions of the
program, between 60 percent and 70 percent of the farmers initially ordered fertilizer. These
rates are substantially higher than under the full-scale SAFI program, most likely because
these were farmers with whom ICS had been working intensely for several months and
because in the pilot SAFI, the field officer harvested with the farmer and SAFI was offered
on the very day of the harvest. In the full-scale version of the SAFI program, the visit took
place in the week following the harvest. When the field officer did not immediately collect
the payment, fertilizer purchase falls significantly: from table 3, when farmers are given a
few days to pay, the fraction who actually purchase fertilizer falls from 64 percent to 30
percent; when they are given a few months, purchase falls to 17 percent. These differences in
purchase rates remain significant when controlling for various background characteristics.
These different SAFI programs were conducted in different villages. To confirm that the
SAFI options themselves, rather than other differences, explain the differential take-up
results, 52 farmers in the same schools were offered the three options in the same season.
Though the sample size is small, the results follow the same stark pattern: among farmers
who had to pay for fertilizer the day after the han^'est. 47 percent purchased fertilizer. Among
farmers who had to wait a few days to pay, 47 percent of farmers initially ordered fertilizer,
but only 29 percent eventually purchased fertilizer. Among farmers who had to wait several
months to pay, 50 percent initially made an order but none eventually purchased fertilizer.
While this extreme result is probably not representative of what would happen in a larger
sample, the sharp decline across the options is evident.
7.2 Farmers are Fully Sophisticated, but Resale of Fertilizer is Possible
Another alternative hypothesis is that farmers are stochastically hyperbolic (as in our model)
but fully sophisticated. Since these farmers fully anticipate the probability that they will be
impatient m the future, they would like to tie their hands even in the absence of SAFI—in
particular, these farmers could buy fertilizer at the harvest on their own and hold it until it is
needed. However, if resale of fertilizer is possible, with reasonably high probability these
farmers may end up being so impatient in the future that they will sell the fertilizer to
increase consumption. If these fanners buy fertilizer, they would pay a purchase cost / in
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period 1. and a resale cost in period 2, but would still end up without fertilizer. Anticipating
this, fully sophisticated farmers who are patient in penod 1 may prefer to delay buying
fertilizer until period 2 to see if they are still patient, rather than to buy in penod 1 and risk
incurrmg resale costs.
Data on the choice of delivery time under the basic SAFI program provides some
evidence against this hypothesis. Recall that when farmers purchased vouchers through SAFI.
they chose a date on which the fertilizer would be delivered by the NGO. Therefore, farmers
could only receive fertilizer at the pre-chosen delivery date.'"' This feature was introduced
precisely to be useful to farmers needing a strong commitment. Under the hypothesis above,
patient sophisticated farmers would take advantage of the SAFI program to lock up resources
to protect them from impatient period 2 farmers by requesting delivery just before the time
that fenilizer needs to be applied. In practice, however, about 90 percent of farmers requested
almost immediate fertilizer delivery (this could be because they thought there was some
hazard rate of ICS bankruptcy or because they wanted to keep the flexibility' of selling back
the fertilizer in case of a serious problem, but in any case, there does not seem to be strong
motivation to guard against resale by future selves). Furthermore, the evidence suggests that
almost nobody sold the fertilizer after buying it. While our data is from self-reports, and the
farmers may have felt bad admitting to the field officer that they re-sold the fertilizer, field
officers were ver\' careful to emphasize to farmers that this was not a subsidy program, and
that the farmers were free to do whatever they wanted with the fertilizer they bought under
the program. Of farmers that bought through the SAFI program, 84 percent of the farmers
report having used the fertilizer on their plot or that of a spouse, 8.1 percent still had the
fertilizer and planned to use it in another season, and 1.6 percent of farmers reported that the
fertilizer had been spoiled. Thus, unless farmers lied about fertilizer use. the upper bound on
the fraction re-sold is probably 6 percent. This suggests that while selling fertilizer is possible
in theor}', this is probably sufficiently costly in practice, and involves sufficient time delays
and fi.xed costs of searching for buyers that even impatient period 2 farmers do not think it is
worthwhile.
Further evidence against the hypothesis that the main benefit of the program for farmers
was the opportunity of strong commitment it offered comes from the farmers from whom an
ICS field officer offered to purchase some maize at a premium price at the very beginning of
the SAFI visit (this program was described above). Since cash is more liquid than maize,
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farmers might particularly want to get strong commitment when they have cash on hand.
However, as discussed above, farmers who were asked to sell their maize were no more
likely to take up the SAFI program than other farmers.
7.3 Farmers are Absent-Minded
Another possible alternative explanation is that while farmers are aware of their own time
inconsistency problems, they deal with so many competing pressures and issues that they
simply do not remember to buy fertilizer early in the season even when they know they
should (see, for instance Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2008b). Under this hypothesis, the field
officer's visit acts as a reminder to stochastically impatient farmers who happen to be patient
in period 1 to buy fertilizer while they are still patient.
A '"reminder" inten'ention provides little support for this explanation. During collection
of post-treatment adoption data in 2005 (two seasons after the initial SAFI treatment, and one
season after the second), field officers visited farmers right after harvest (at the same time the
SAFI intervention would normally be conducted), and read farmers a script, reminding them
that fertilizer was available at nearby shops and in small quantities, and that we had met
many farmers in the area who had made plans to use fertilizer, but subsequently did not
manage to implement them. The field officer then urged the farmers to buy fertilizer early if
they thought they were likely to have this problem (note that this intervention would also
increase fertilizer take up under our model if it raised p, making farmers more aware of their
time inconsistency problem). To measure the impact of the inter\'ention, field officers
surveyed farmers at the time of top dressing for the following season to determine if they had
purchased fertilizer or planned to. The reminder intervention did not significantly affect
whether the fanners either bought or planned to buy top dressing fertilizer by the time they





In earlier work (Duflo, et al., 2008) we presented evidence that fertilizer is profitable in
Western Kenya but many farmers do not use it. Though several factors likely contribute to
this,' the model and evidence in this paper suggests behavioral factors likely play an
important role.
'^ Farmers could also come to the ICS office if they lived near town, but in practice very few farmers did this.
'* In particular, demonstration plot experiments suggested that many farmers who do not currently use fertilizer
do not know how much to use, and would likely have low or negative return if they used as much as they think
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Our model suggests small, time-limited discounts can potentially help present-biased
farmers overcome procrastination problems, while minimally distorting the investment
decisions of farmers who do not suffer from such problems. Empirically, small, time-limited
reductions in the cost of purchasing fertilizer at the time of har\'est induce substantial
increases in fertilizer use. comparable to those induced by much larger price reductions later
in the season. . ' .
A policy of small, time-limited subsidies may therefore be attractive. It would mcrease
fertilizer use for present-biased farmers, but would create mmimal distortions in behavior of
farmers who were not present-biased. It would thus presumably be environmentally more
attractive than hea\'>' subsidies, and would not encourage heaw rent-seeking as large
subsidies might. One important caveat is that this policy of small, time-limited discounts does
not achieve the first best from the perspective of a hypothetical period zero farmer, since
farmers who are impatient in period 1 will not take advantage of such a discount. Indeed, it is
worth noting that while the S.A.FI program boosted fertilizer use substantially from pre-
existing levels, take-up remained quite low.
Calibration suggests that small, time-limited subsidies are likely to yield higher welfare
than either heavy subsidies or laissez faire. However, that calibration ignored the
administrative and staff costs of implementing either type of program. With those costs
figured in. the SAFI program itself, with its delivery of small quantities of fertilizer to
farmers by field officers, is too expensive (m terms of staff costs) to be cost effective and
therefore could not be directly adopted as policy. However, preliminary results from a pilot
program designed to mimic key elements of SAFI without individual free deliver)' (and thus
expensive visits to farms) suggest that time-limited coupons for small discounts on fertilizer
could cost effectively increase take-up. During school meetings, coupons for a reduction of 6
Kenyan shillings (17 percent) in the price of up to 5 kilograms of fertilizer were distnbuted to
94 parents (there was no comparison group). Coupons had to be redeemed at a set of
identified shops in the region within 10 days, and field officers obser\'ed fertilizer sales in
these selected location to ensure that the coupons were actually redeemed by fanners.
Overall, 3 1 percent of farmers who received the coupon purchased fertilizer (most of them at
they should. Furthermore, it seems likely that there are important barriers to social learning in this environment,
since demonstration plots led to significant increases in adoption (presumably due to informational effects) but
no spillover to geographical neighbors or agricultural contacts.
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the end of the ten-day period). Though the absence of a control group makes it impossible to
know whether the program increased actual fertilizer usage, '^ it is striking that a 1 7 percent
reduction in the price of fertilizer immediately after han'est, which still required a visit to the
shop, potentially led to almost as large an increase in fertilizer purchases as a 50 percent
reduction in the cost of fertilizer with free delivery at the time fertilizer needs to be used.
Since we did not monitor farmers to see who actually used fertilizer, we cannot know how
much of this was offset in reduced purchases from other sources. We also cannot rule out the
possibility of some resale of fertilizer, but we believe it is unlikely there was much resale
smce prices on the resale market typically involve substantial. discounts, and the total
discount farmers received for 5 kilograms of fertilizer was only Ksh 30 (about US $0.50).
This makes a strategy of purchase for resale, therefore, seem unattractive. Overall, this pilot
version of the time-limited subsidy is thus encouraging that a time-limited small discount
program on fertilizer may be an effective, easy to scale up, policy to encourage fertilizer use
without distorting decision making and inducing excessive use of fertilizer.
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Table 1. SAFI & Subsidy Programs
SAFI Comparison Difference
Panel A. SAFI for Season 1 (1J (2) (3)
SAFI Season 1
Income (in 1,000 Kenyan sfiiliings)
Years Education Household Head
Household had Used Fertilizer Prior
to Season 1
Home has Mud Walls
Home has Mud Floor
Home has Thatch Roof
Observations
Post Treatment Behavior
Household bought fertilizer through
program
Observations
Adoption in Season of Program
Observations
Note: In each Panel, means and standard deviations for each variable are presented, along with
differences (and standard errors of the differences) between each treatment group and the comparison
group. The comparison group in Panel A consists of those not sampled for both SAFI, even if they had
been sampled for other treatments (see text and Table 2).
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the study period. ' ' ' '




















Table 1 (continued). SAFI & Subsidy Programs
SAFI SAFI with Subsidy at Full Price at Comparison
Timing Choice Top Dressing Top Dressing
(1) (2) {3) (A) (5)
2.84 2.86 2.29 2.81 2.40
(7.53) (7.36) (4.01) (6.68) (4.47)
6.99 6.84 7.13 6.99 7.58
(3.98) (4.12) (4.13) (4.02) (4.30)
0.42 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.51
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
0.88 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.87
(0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.29) (0.34)
0.83 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.86
(0.38) (0.33) (0.36) (0.32) (0.35)
0.53 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.53
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
228 235 160 160 141
0.39 0.41 0,46 0.20 _
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.40) -
208 207 145 143 -
0.38 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.28
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45)




Income (in 1.000 Kenyan shillings)
Years Education Household Head
Household had Used Fertilizer Prior
to Season 1
Home has Mud Walls
Home has Mud Floor
Home has Thatch Roof
Obsen^ations
Post Treatment Behavior
HH bought fertilizer through program
Observations
Adoption in Season of Program
Observations
Differences Between Treatment and Comparison
Baseline Characteristics
Income
Years Education Household Head
Household had Used Fertilizer Prior
to Season 1
Home has Mud Walls
Home has Mud Floor
Home has Thatch Roof
Observations 228 235 160 160 141
Post Treatment Behavior
Adoption in Season of Program
ObsePv-ations
Note: In each Panel, means and standard deviations for each variable are presented, along with
differences (and standard errors of the differences) between each treatment group and the comparison
group. The companson group consists of those not sampled for both SAFI, even if they had
been sampled for other treatments (see text and Table 2).
The number of obser^'ations is the number of farmers in each group with non-missing adoption data in the
season of the program.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the study pehod.
* significant at 10%; " significant at 5%; "' significant at 1%
0.440 0.456 -0.110 0.402
(0.727) (0,714) (0.514) (0,692)
-0.595 -0.740 -0.456 -0.588
(0.440) (0.446)* (0.487) (0.479)
-0.094 -0.100 -0.129 -0.073
(0.053)' (0.053)* (0.057)** (0.058)
0.005 0.013 -0.012 0.034
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.036)
-0.034 0.018 -0.010 0.029
(0.040) (0.036) (0.041) (0,038)
0.006 0.003 -0,031 0.025
(0.054) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058)
0.105 0.197 0.139 0.051
(0.059)* (0.059)*** (0.063)** (0.060)
179 208 133 135










SAFI Season 1 0.114 0.143 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.01
(0.035)*** (0.038)*** (0.041) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041)
Starter Kit Farmer 0.059 0.080 0.024 0.005 -0,009 -0.027
(0.042) (0.046)* (0.047) (0.051) (0.043) (0.048)
Starter Kit Farmer ' Demonstration Plot -0.026 -0.061 0.024 -0.005 0.004 -0.031
School (0.060) (0.066) (0.068) (0.075) (0.063) (0.070)
Demonstration Plot School 0.006 0.441 0.362 0.464 0.362 0.437
(0.314) (0.435) (0.460) (0.463) (0.335) (0.465)
Household had Used Fertilizer Prior 0.369 0.315 0.319 0.284 0.281 0.251



















Income In past month 0.004 0.006 0.002
(in 1,000 Kenyan shillings) (0.003) (0.003)" (0.003)
Observations 876 716 756 626 902 734
Used Fertilizer Used Fertilizer Used Fertilizer
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Panel B. 2004 Season 2 Treatments (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SAFI Season 2 -0.009 0.042 0.165 0.181 -0.024 -0.005
(0.053) (0.057) (0.061)*** (0,066)*** (0.056) (0.061)
SAFI Season 2 with Choice -0.014 0.03 0.207 0.216 -0.027 0,003
on Date of Return (0.048) (0.053) (0.055)*** (0.060)"* (0.050) (0.056)
Half Price Subsidy Visit at Top Dressing -0.035 -0.039 0.142 0.127 0.023 0.041
(0.052) (0,057) (0.059)** (0.065)* (0.054) (0.061)
Full Price Visit at Top Dressing -0.065 -0.034 0.096 0.104 -0.053 -0.031
(0.052) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.054) (0.061)
Bought Maize -0.002 -0.011 -0.042 0.079 0.002 -0.014
-.' (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) (0.054) (0.046) (0.050)
Bought Maize ' SAFI Season 2 -0.048 -0.073 -0.085 -0.057 0.005 -0.011
(0.075) (0.082) (0.087) (0.096) (0.080) (0.087)
Household had Used Fertilizer Prior 0.369 0.316 0.325 0.283 0.278 0.248
to Season 1 (0.031)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.040)*'* (0.033)*" (0.037)'"
Male 0.01 0.014 0.028
--'""-" (0.033) (0.037) (0.035)
Home has mud walls -0.197 -0.197 -0.017
•'
. (0.081)** (0.091)*' -0.086






Income in past month 0.004 0.006 0.003
(In 1,000 Kenyan shillings) (0.003) (0.003)" (0.003)
Mean Usage in Comparison Group 0.247 0.228 0.297 0.300 0.392 0.397
Observations 876 • 716 756 626 902 734
Note: Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the farmer adopted planting or top dressing fertilizer In the
given season. All regressions control for school, and whether the farmer was a parent of a Standard 5 or 6
child (see text). Panel B also Include controls for the Season 1 Treatments listed in Panel A.
The comparison group means listed In the bottom of the table are for Individuals that did not participate In either
SAFI, were not offered fertilizer at any price, and did not participate in the starter kit program. This accounts
for the difference in mean usage between this Table and Table 1
.
There are fewer observations than In Table 1 because of missing values for previous usage. For all programs
listed above, respondents were allowed to buy either DAP (for planting) or CAN (for top dressing) fertilizer.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the study period.
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